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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates market behavior and ﬁrms’ lobbying in a
uniﬁed structural setup. In a sequential game, where ﬁrms lobby for regulation be-
fore they compete in the product market, we derive a testable measure of lobbying
coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we
ﬁnd that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and mar-
ket conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps
were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular ﬁrms
eﬀectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs.
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11 Introduction
Besides directly product related measures such as quantity and price, ﬁrms have a variety
of tools at their disposal in order to maximize proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, companies operating in
regulated industries have an incentive to lobby politicians and bureaucrats for concessions.
The way ﬁrms organize their interests and how much they are willing to invest in lobbying
crucially depends on product market characteristics such as demand and cost conditions
as well as the degree of competition. Hence, from a business perspective, lobbying expen-
ditures and product market strategic variables are interdependent. Despite the intuitive
appeal of this argument and ubiquitous evidence of rent seeking by individual ﬁrms or
industry associations, economists have paid relatively little attention to the simultaneity
of interest group formation and market behavior. Moreover, the political economy liter-
ature has not yet developed means to evaluate the degree of ﬁrms’ coordination in their
political activities based on lobbying data.
This paper investigates lobbying for regulation and product market competition. The
empirical model is based on a two stage game, where ﬁrms lobby in the ﬁrst stage and
their political contribution is immediately rewarded by a policy response. In the second
stage the ﬁrms set quantities. Instead of presupposing coordination among the ﬁrms, we
identify and estimate one behavioral parameter in each subgame. The estimation of a
coordination parameter in the lobbying game is possible because we explicitly specify the
costs of lobbying and its gains in terms of product market proﬁts.
Our theoretical model is tailored to the characteristics of the early U.S. mobile telecom-
munications industry. Estimating coordination in ﬁrms’ lobbying activities calls for data
of an industry with a number of comparable but independent lobbying and policy deci-
sions. Being divided into many small geographical markets, which are exposed to varying
forms of state speciﬁc regulation, the U.S. cellular industry is uniquely suited to investi-
gate the interrelation between product markets and lobbying. During the sample period,
the second half of the 1980s, the most notable aspect of regulatory power that was as-
signed to the individual states pertained to their discretion over price regulation. At that
2time a number of U.S. states had imposed price controls in the form of price caps.1 Other
state-level policy decisions, such as restrictions on the placement of cellular antennas,
aﬀect the proﬁts of the cellular business through the production costs.2 Both channels of
state intervention, price caps and cost related regulation, rationalize rent seeking activities
by mobile telecommunication operators.3
The term lobbying denotes a number of activities, some of which are either not reported
or are impossible to quantify. In this paper, we measure ﬁrms’ lobbying eﬀorts by their
contributions to the campaigns of political parties. In the U.S., campaign contributions
are widely used by individual companies and industrial interest groups and have the
additional advantage of being publicly disclosed.4 They are a means for cellular operators
to access to politicians who, in return, may change rules that aﬀect ﬁrms’ costs and adjust
p r i c ec a p so re x e r ti n ﬂuence on the price regulating authority.
Our results suggest that, on average, product markets and lobbying were in a Cournot
Nash equilibrium. In price-regulated states, price caps actually inﬂicted restrictions on
ﬁrms’ market conduct. Campaign contributions, as a means of inﬂuencing political and
regulatory decisions, were eﬀective in lowering the burden of the price caps and in reducing
the production costs. We also ﬁnd that the cost advantage achieved through campaign
contributions varies signiﬁcantly across ﬁrms. In particular, Bell companies seem to have
proﬁted in terms of greater cost reducing eﬀects than their competitors.
Methodologically, this paper expands the structural empirical industrial economics
(EIO) approach to the analysis of political economy questions. Empirical investigations
of rent seeking coordination among ﬁrms are challenging, because, in order to identify the
1We interpret various types of regulation as being in eﬀect a form of price cap regulation. See chapter
2 for details.
2For example, see the State Highway Maintainance Manual issued by the Wisconsin Department of
Transportation (DOT), policies 96.31 and 96.41, which regulate longitudinal antenna installations on
freeways: one among many requirements is that the utility shall pay a full-time inspector representing
the DOT during the installation period. Although this example stems from a time after our sample
period, it illustrates the cost-related state level regulatory issues in this industry.
3We abstract from lobbying for entry regulation, because the market structure of the U.S. mobile
telecommunications industry was settled on a long-run basis at the federal level before the sample period.
See Hazlett and Michaels (1993) for a rent seeking analysis of this process.
4Ansolabehre et. al. (2002) ﬁnd a strong positive association between PAC (Public Action Committee)
contributions and actual expenses of registered lobbyists.
3economic primitives of the lobbying process, they require a theoretical model that includes
the product market, regulation, and lobbying. The complexity of issues involved in the
emergence and impact of speciﬁc policies explains why the literature in political economy
has rarely adopted a structural approach for estimating interactions among agents.5 We
t e s tt h et y peo ft h el o b b y i n gg a m et h a tﬁrms play based on a conjectural variations concept
as it has been used in EIO (see Bresnahan, 1989). The identiﬁcation of this parameter
relies on explicitly modeling the interactions between the market game and lobbying
decisions. One of the advantages of the conjectural variations approach over other methods
for identifying cooperation empirically, is its ﬂexibility to cover diﬀerent games in a single
estimation. Furthermore, this method can be applied to aggregated market data and
absent cost information. Of course, ignoring diﬀerences between the ﬁrms, the conduct
parameter will only be valid on average. As another drawback, inference which is based on
static conduct parameter measurement may lack statistical power if the underlying game
is dynamic and demand states are not strongly correlated over time (Corts, 1999). Puller
(2002) avoids this shortcoming by estimating conduct in an explicitly dynamic model.
A number of recent theoretical contributions have integrated market games, policy
making and lobbying. Baron (1999) shows that ﬁrms lobby not only because of the
direct eﬀect regulation has on proﬁts, but also to improve their competitive advantage
compared to rivals, who might be less able to comply with the requirements imposed by
the authorities.6 However, he does not address the problem of how ﬁrms overcome the
well known free rider problem in group formation (Olson, 1965) and achieve coordination.
Other recent articles (Damania and Fredriksson, 2000 and 2002, and Ludema, 2001)
focus instead on this point and explain lobbying formation as the outcome of an inﬁnitely
repeated game. They both show that coordination in product market, i.e. collusion, plays
5Exceptions include Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and Eicher
and Osang (2002) who structurally test whether industrial lobbying has successfully inﬂuenced trade
protection. Interest groups’ lobbying decisions are, however, exogenous in these constributions.
6In a diﬀerent modeling approach Grossman and Helpman (1994) study trade protection lobbying in a
framework, where (exogenously given) interest groups bid contingent on future policy decisions. They do
not, however, model the market game, even though they show that competition among rivaling interest
groups shapes their policy preferences.
4a central role in explaining lobbying group formation.
Our model assumes that policy decisions may aﬀect ﬁrms’ production costs. Thus,
ﬁrms have an incentive to lobby for alleviating cost increasing regulations. This argu-
ment makes costs endogenous to the market game. Ignoring this endogeneity biases the
inference about market conduct. Röller and Sickles (2000) give an example of how the
endogeneity of costs matters in the context of measuring market power in the airline
industry.
A number of recent papers (Besley and Case, 2000; Duso and Röller, 2003; and Duso,
2003) indicate the importance of the endogeneity of regulation for the assessment of
market outcomes, but do not identify its sources. Our paper explicitly models lobbying
by ﬁrms as a cause of the endogeneity of regulation.
In this paper, we use the same market data as Parker and Röller (1997), who ﬁnd that
prices in the cellular industry were, on average, higher than in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
and that conduct depended on exogenous product market characteristics. The results
that we obtain in an earlier contribution indicate that ﬁrms’ campaign contributions
are endogenous with respect to the market game and that their level has an impact on
market conduct (Duso and Jung, 2002). The inference in that paper is, however, based
on a combination of a structural market model with a descriptive lobbying equation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the U.S. cellular market
and the data. In section 3 we develop a structural model of product market interac-
tions and lobbying decision and derive the ﬁrst order conditions. Section 4 is devoted to
the empirical implementation. Section 5 discusses the estimation results, and section 6
concludes.
2T h e D a t a
The regulatory and market environment in the U.S. cellular industry in the second half
of the 1980’s are unique and constitute an excellent natural experiment for analyzing
the relationship between lobbying and competition. On the one hand, we observe, for
5production as well as political decisions, many geographically separated markets within a
single industry (for the former, the Metropolitan Statistical Areas and for the latter, the
states). This fact guarantees enough heterogeneity — in the sense of statistical variation
— to investigate the empirical interrelation between market-level collusion and state-level
lobbying.
On the other hand, the product market is homogeneous, which justiﬁes the same
functional speciﬁcation for the demand and ﬁrst order condition across markets. Moreover,
because of the homogeneity of the institutional environment across U.S. states, unobserved
heterogeneity in the estimation of the lobbying equation is minimized.
Another important characteristic of the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry is
that the market structure was exogenously determined during the entire sample period.
Each of the considered markets started in the middle of the 1980’s as a monopoly and
was subsequently opened up to a second ﬁrm. This peculiarity allows us to concentrate
on market conduct in a speciﬁed market structure and to rule out more complex games,
where ﬁrms make their production decisions under the pressure of potential entry.
The database that we use is remarkably rich and covers the sample period 1985-1988.
It contains product market variables such as prices, output, demand, cost, and market
structure variables and information about the regulatory and political environments, such
as the structure of the regulatory body and the composition of the states’ governments
and legislatures. Furthermore, it provides data on ﬁrms’ political activities measured by
their campaign contributions to political parties.
Part of the data has been already exploited in other studies. The market data were
collected and used by Parker and Röller (1997), and we aggregated them to yearly ob-
servations in order to match the lobbying data.7 The political data originates form the
Book of the States and from the U.S. Statistical Abstract. The data on political contri-
7The market data originate from many diﬀerent sources, such as Cellular Price and Marketing Let-
ter, Information Enterprise, Cellular Business, Cellular Market Data Book, EMCI, BOMA Experience
Exchange Report, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Department of commerce, and Bureau of Census. We refer the interested reader to Parker and
Röller (1997) for a more precise description of the market data. We are very grateful to Phil Parker and
Lars-Hendrik Röller for allowing us to use their data.
6butions were kindly provided by the Center of Responsive Politics that elaborates ﬁgures
stemming from the Federal Election Commission.8
Table 1 reports a brief description of the variables used in this study, whereas tables
2 and 3 contain the preliminary statistics. The ﬁrst column of table 2 refers to the full
sample, in which observations do not follow a speciﬁc periodicity. The aggregated sample
represented in the second column of the table denotes the average observation for a given
year calculated to match the market variables to the lobbying data, which is observed on a
yearly basis. As a result the new market data contains one to four yearly observations for
each of the considered 122 metropolitan markets. The diﬀerences in the mean and stan-
dard errors of the variables between the two samples are very small and not statistically
signiﬁcant.
A p a r tf r o mm a r k e tp r i c e( P )a n dq u a n t i t y( Q ) , 9 w eh a v ei n f o r m a t i o no nd e m a n d
shifters like the market population (POP), annual income per capita (INCOME), pop-
ulation density (DENSITY), and the number of high potential business establishments
(BUSINESS). The data on cost shifters include the cost of energy (ENERGY), oﬃce and
operation costs (RENT and OPERATE), labor costs in the cellular industry (WAGE), and
cost of capital (PRIME). A dummies equal to one indicates duopoly periods (ENTRY).
During the sample period a number of US states had imposed explicit or implicit price
caps on cellular tariﬀs. We denote price regulation as implicit price cap regimes, when
cellular service prices must be approved by the Public Utility Commission (PUC), which
beforehand does not publicly disclose critical price levels. Three U.S. states adopted a
modiﬁed version of proﬁt regulation. We also include these states in the set of states with
implicit price cap regimes, because the operators’ costs were rarely investigated by the
authorities (see Shew, 1994). Based on the categories used by Shew we deﬁne the variable
8In particular, we thank Douglas Weber from the Center for Responsive Politics for making available
the unpublished data on political contributions for our sample period.
9The price of a singular cellular operator is deﬁned as the monthly bill paid by a costumer for 500
minutes of usage, assuming that he chooses the least expensive among the diﬀerent plans oﬀered. Since
output levels are not directly observable, the quantity is proxied by the number of cellular antenna sites
used by operators. Parker and Röller calculated from a sub-sample with available output measures a
correlation index between the number of antennas and the number of subscribers equal to 0.92 (p-value
< 0.0001).
7PRICECAP such that it is equal to one in states where price caps or proﬁtr e g u l a t i o n
was imposed or when the operators were required to ﬁle their tariﬀsw i t ht h eP U C . 10
In table 3 we report statistics for the political variables, which constitute a balanced
panel with four yearly observations for each of the 40 states included in our sample.
The information covers the composition of the diﬀerent states’ legislature and executive:
a dummy equal to one if the governor came from the democratic party (GOVDEM),
and the governor’s salary (GSALARY). Variables related to the regulatory body are the
Public Utility Commission’s number of board members (PUCMEM), the length of their
oﬃce (PUCTERM), their salary (PUCSALARY), and the number of full-time employees
(PUCSTAFF). Indicators for election years (PRESELECT, FEDELECT, LEGISELECT)
and for how close the state-level election results of the parties were to each other (TIGHT)
are also included in the data set. Other potential controls for the lobbying process are
the population of the state (POPSTATE) and its average income (INCSTATE). Finally,
lobbying (LOBBY) represents the yearly aggregated campaign contributions from cellular
ﬁrms operating in a state to candidates of that state who campaign in federal elections.
All political variables lag one year with respect to the market and lobbying data
because a newly elected government needs some time before being able to implement
policy changes.
3 A Sequential Model of Lobbying and Product Mar-
ket Competition
In this paragraph we will introduce and discuss a model, which is designed to be the
economic backbone of our estimations. Because we explicitly formalize the eﬀect of lob-
bying expenditures on ﬁrms’ proﬁts, we are able to identify coordination in lobbying.
Although a number of details and simpliﬁcations reﬂect the peculiarities of the U.S. mo-
bile telecommunications industry or accommodate data limitations, the main body of the
analysis could be applied to other industries as well.
10We exclude New York and South Carolina from the list of price cap regulated states. Oﬃcially these
states imposed caps. The caps where, however, set by the companies.
8Reﬂecting the structure of the U.S. cellular industry with its regional markets and
state-level price regulation, the model considers ﬁrms (i), which are active in product
markets (m) within states (s). Time subscripts are omitted.
We assume that the operators in each market supply a homogenous good in a quantity





,w h e r eQms is the
total quantity produced in this market and XD
ms denotes a vector of demand characteris-
tics.





,w h i c h
includes as arguments the ﬁrm’s quantity, Qims, the total lobbying expenditures of the
industry at the state level, Ls, and market speciﬁcc o s td r i v e r s ,XC
ms. The interpretation
of lobbying expenditures as a cost shifter implicitly assumes that ﬁrms lobby in order to
push policy decisions which decrease their costs. These decisions generally cover a range
of aspects such as production related taxes or legal requirements. An example from the
cellular industry are restrictions issued by each state on the placement of antennas. The
diversity of regulatory issues that potentially aﬀect costs raises the problem of how the
individual policies are inﬂuenced by the ﬁrms and how multidimensional regulation relates
to costs. Because in our empirical study we apply a broad measure of lobbying, which
cannot be linked to speciﬁc policy decisions, we omit the regulatory decisions and include
lobbying expenditures directly into the cost function. The assumption that aggregate
rather than individual lobbying expenditures matter in Ci, implies that politicians and
regulators make their decisions as a function of total lobbying expenditures, Ls,a n d
regardlessly of who contributes the money. With this simpliﬁcation it will be possible to
estimate the model with industry-level lobbying data.
11Quantity competition is assumed, although the actual game in the early cellular industry is better
understood as a pricing game with capacity constraints. For the two models to be equivalent, equilibrium
prices in the latter must be such that the capacity constraint is binding (see Kreps and Scheinkman,
1983). For the U.S. cellular industry, where capacitity is determined by the number of antennas, while
the number of subscribers or air time minutes reﬂect actual production, we argue that the equivalence
holds at least approximatly during the industry’s early development phase for two reasons. First, upon
receiving licenses from the Federal Trade Commission, operators were not obliged to immediately cover
the entire market with antennas. The data reveals that, indeed, the licencees did not install a huge
capacity in the beginning of their business, but rather extended their networks steadily. Second, capacity
and production measured by the number of subscribers are closely related (see footnote 9).
9During our sample period, a number of U.S. states regulated cellular tariﬀs. Although
the precise design varied, in practice, price regulation explicitly or implicitly established
price caps denoted by Ps. The price cap, where actually binding, establishes an incentive
for the constrained ﬁrms to inﬂuence it. Therefore, we assume that Ps reﬂects the value of





, which depends on the industry’s lobbying expenditures and state
characteristics, XP
s . In contrast, we exclude the possibility that lobbying by the cellular
operators aﬀects the regulatory regime, i.e. on whether a state imposes price regulation
at all.12
We establish ﬁrms’ maximization problem assuming that the regional markets are
independent except for being exposed to the same regulation within a state. Hence,
deciding about lobbying expenditures and production, a ﬁrm i operating in Mis markets


































where Rs =1if state s imposes price caps, otherwise zero.13 Since, in our model, lobbying
is formalized as expenditures, Lis in (1) reﬂects the individual cost of lobbying. Because
ﬁrms lobby at the state level, their lobbying costs are deducted from the proﬁts which
they earn in all markets within a state.
We consider lobbying and quantity setting in a sequential game: First ﬁrms decide
simultaneously on their lobbying expenditures and observe its immediate eﬀect on price
12This assumption is motivated by the data. The regimes were determined before the markets actually
started to operate and very rarely changed. Amendments occurred only towards less regulation, reﬂecting
a general political trend during the 80s. Within our model ﬁrms in regulated states can de facto abolish
the price cap by increasing it through lobbying to a suﬃciently high level.
13Strictly speaking, price cap regulation implies for each ﬁrm i a residual inverse demand function
with a kink at a critical quantiy Qims that is derived from market demand at a price Ps and the rivals’
production. For Qims ≤ Qims the inverse residual demand is ﬂat at the level of Ps, while for Qims ≥ Qims
it has the same shape as without a price cap. Provided the usual regularity conditions for demand hold,
proﬁt maximization involving such a kinked inverse demand is analytically identical to maximizing proﬁts
with the original inverse demand function and subject to (2).
10caps and costs. Then they set quantities simultaneously.14 In order to empirically analyze
the degree of cooperation at both stages within the conjectural variations framework, it
is suﬃcient to derive ﬁrst-order conditions for the one-shot game. The following solves
the game by backward induction, starting with the second stage.
Since we assume that the product markets within a state are only related by being ex-
posed to the same policy, which is exogenous to the second stage game, quantity decisions
are made independently for each market. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimal

















P (·) − P (·)
¤
, and (5)
0 ≤ φims, (6)
where Ims is the number of ﬁrms in market m within state s and φims denotes the Lagrange
multiplier for ﬁrm i’s mth constraint in state s. Depending on assumptions about ﬁrms’
behavior, θ
Q
ims is equal to zero (if a market is perfectly competitive), to 1/Ims (in a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium), and to 1 (in a monopoly or symmetric cartel).
Equation (3) reduces to the usual ﬁrst order condition in unregulated markets within
unregulated states (Rs =0 )o ri nc a s e sw h e r et h ep r i c ec a pi sn o tb i n d i n g( φims =0 ).
When the cap is binding, then (3) reﬂects that marginal revenues now exceed marginal
costs by −φims∂P/∂Qms ≥ 0 at the quantity level which would be optimal without price
regulation. Provided that, in the relevant range, marginal revenues are decreasing and




ims is a measure of conduct. It is equal to one plus the conjectural
14It is straightforward to set up an alternative model where ﬁrms choose lobbying expenditures and
quantities simultaneously. In order to be reasonable in the current context, such a model requires lobbying
to aﬀect policy with a lag — otherwise it would imply that ﬁrms do not observe the price cap which actually
applies to their production decisions. The sample in our empirical application is too short in the time
dimension and too unbalanced to accommodate the lagged version.



















Before competing in the product markets, each ﬁrm decides about its lobbying expen-
ditures at the state level. In the lobbying game, the ﬁrst-order condition of ﬁrm i in state

































where Is represents the number of ﬁrms in state s,t h et e r mdQ∗
ims/dLs accounts for
ﬁrm i’s quantity reaction following all lobbying decisions, and the asterisks indicate the
proﬁt maximizing quantity choices at the second stage. The marginal cost of lobbying
expenditures is naturally equal to one and, in an optimum, just balances the marginal
gain from lobbying, which occurs on those product markets, where the ﬁrm operates.
The product market proﬁts are aﬀected by lobbying through a number of channels. The
ﬁrst addend within the brackets reﬂects that aggregate lobbying expenditures change the
market price indirectly through quantity adjustments. A price increase boosts revenues,
but, on the other hand, tightens the constraint imposed by the price cap. The second
addend incorporates the more direct revenue eﬀect due to a quantity change and the costs
of the quantity adjustment following lobbying. ∂Ci (·)/∂Ls captures the eﬀect of lobbying
on costs and φimsRs∂P (·)/∂Ls denotes the price cap’s change due to successful lobbying,
which is worth φimsRs. All of these eﬀects occur in all markets within the state where
ﬁrm i lobbies. However, their relevance hinges on what ﬁrm i expects would happen to
aggregate lobbying expenditures, given its own change in Lis. Thus, it is straightforward
15A standardized conduct measure establishes a monotonic relationship between conduct and equi-
librium choices of endogenous variables, irrespective of the number of players. This is important for
empirical analysis where conduct is estimated as a constant parameter for observations with a varying
number of players.





















where the second addend is the conjectural variation of ﬁrm i. In the lobbying context,
the conjectural variation represents how a ﬁrm expects other players will respond should
it change its lobbying contribution. In a Cournot-Nash game players do not take the
reactions of their rivals into account, hence θ
L
is =1 /Is. A game of perfect competition
in lobbying would be characterized by ﬁrms expecting other ﬁrms to accommodate their
behavior such that total lobbying is unaﬀected. This implies θ
L
is =0 .I fﬁrms are cartelized,
they internalize the eﬀects of their own actions on the proﬁts of the other cartel members.
It is straightforward to derive that with symmetric cartelized ﬁrms θ
L
is must be equal to
one.
4 Empirical Implementation
The empirical implementation of the above model involves the speciﬁcation and estimation
of the inverse market demand function P (·), the conditions (3)-(6), and equation (7).
Throughout this section, Greek characters denote parameters. Exogenous variables, as
well as their corresponding parameters, should be read as vectors. Time subscripts are
omitted, because, with our panel data being very short and unbalanced, we abstract from
time eﬀects in residuals.
Following Parker and Röller (1997) we specify a semilogarithmic inverse demand func-
tion:
Pms = β0 + β1 lnQms + β2X
D
ms. (8)
The marginal cost function is approximated by
∂Ci (·)
∂Qims
= α0 + α1Qims + α2Ls + α3X
C
ms, (9)
where α2Ls denotes the eﬀect of lobbying expenditures on marginal costs. In the estima-
tions we will also allow α2 to vary with i in order to reﬂect diﬀerences in the ﬁrms’ ability
to follow regulatory requirements.






in lobbying expenditures and exogenous variables such that the ﬁrst derivative equals
∂P (·)
∂Ls
= δ0 + δ1X
P
s . (10)
The remainder of this section discusses the empirical implementation of the decision
rules for quantity setting and lobbying with the above speciﬁcations.
Unless a price cap is not constraining the behavior of the ﬁrm, equation (3) is not a
ﬁrst order condition on its own. When a cap binds, production will be determined by the
demand function at the point where the price equals the cap. In this case (3) expresses the
deviation of the unconstrained from the constrained optimum identifying the shadow price
of the constraint, φims. Estimating quantity based on equation (3) ignores a censoring
problem in the observed quantity, since Qims cannot not be smaller than some Qims,w h i c h
is derived from the price cap and the production of rivals. Censoring due in this case,
is usually accommodated by deriving a likelihood function that depends on whether the
constraint is binding or not (see Wales and Woodland, 1982). For the cellular industry
data in our study we do not observe the price cap. In fact, in some states, where tariﬀs
were subject to approval by the PUC, the caps were only implicit. Thus, we are not
able to distinguish observations where Qims = Qims.16 For this reason estimations in this
paper are based on (3) and ignore potential censoring of regulated quantities.
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Q =1for monopoly markets. Equation (11) allows us to estimate ﬁrms’ conduct based
on market-level data.17 As a drawback of working with market-level data, we are not able
16In principle P could be estimated from the observed lobbying expenditures and other variables.
However, due to the lack of a full structural model for the policy choice such estimates cannot be expected
to be precise enough to sort out the binding constraint cases from the data in a satisfactory way.
17Note that equation (11) has two solutions in the endogenous variable Qms. One of these solutions is
excluded by concavity of the maximization problem in Qims (suﬃcient condition: α1 ≥ 0, β1 ≤ 0)a n d
the fact that the parameters θ
Q and φ as well as the optimal quantity must be positive.
14to identify diﬀerences among ﬁrms in their marginal cost functions, their conjectures, and
the Lagrange parameter. In a homogeneous good setting, where all ﬁrms within a market
face the same demand function, symmetric costs and conjectures imply Qims = Qjms,
hence Qms = ImsQims.
The empirical implementation of the lobbying equation (7) requires an explicit ex-
pression for the reaction of each ﬁrm’s production to changes in aggregate lobbying,
dQ∗
ims/dLs. Applying the implicit function theorem to the ﬁrm-level version of the quan-




















which is identical for all ﬁr m s .I ft h ee s t i m a t e( 1 2 )i ss i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, this
would reject a model where lobbying and quantity decisions are made simultaneously.
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s ) − α2Qs
¢
− 1, (13)
where Ms is the number of markets in state s, Qs denotes the cumulative production
in s,a n dNs = Σ
Is
i ΣMis




Note that the marginal cost of lobbying expenditures is equal to one and, therefore, the
same for all ﬁrms. However, unlike the consequences of symmetric cost on the quantity
decision discussed earlier, this does not imply identical lobbying expenditures by all ﬁrms,
because, by operating in a varying number of markets with diﬀerent characteristics, each
ﬁrm has an idiosyncratic marginal beneﬁt from its political activities.
The estimations involve equation (13) and, according to the number of markets within
as t a t e( Ms), multiple equations of types (8) and (11).18 The parameter θ
Q is identiﬁed,
18In all iterations we restricted φ to be greater or equal to zero. While this might have had an eﬀect
on the search direction for the parameter estimates, it was not a binding constraint upon convergence.





the eﬃciency of the delta and beta parameters. Since φ is estimated as a constant and, furthermore,
because we consider the empirical implementation of P(·) and P(·) as approximations to their true
functional form, we refrain from imposing these additional requirements.
15because we allow market conduct to vary with market structure requiring θ
Q =1for
monopolies. For the identiﬁcation of (13) note that θ
Q, φ, alphas, and betas are identiﬁed
from the inverse demand equation and from (11). The conjectural variations parameter,
θ
L,i si d e n t i ﬁed by imposing θ
L =1if only one ﬁrm operates in the state (Is =1 ).
Identiﬁcation of δ0 and δ1 is then straightforward.
We apply a full information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML) as described in
appendix A assuming normally distributed error terms.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Basic Model
In our baseline regressions the focus is on the average eﬀect of lobbying. Estimates from
two speciﬁcations are displayed in tables 4 and 5 in appendix C. In the ﬁrst table the
eﬀect of lobbying on price caps takes into account a number of characteristics of the Public
Utility Commission (PUC), while the second controls for state characteristics in the eﬀect
of lobbying on price caps.19
Despite the diﬀerences in the speciﬁcation, the results from tables 4 and 5are very
similar.20 The variables inﬂuencing marginal production costs are highly signiﬁcant. Mar-
ginal costs increase in the factor prices WAGE and RENT as well as in output, the latter
suggesting diseconomies of scale. The apparent increase of costs over the years is likely
due to the variation of other input prices over time.21
On average, ﬁrms’ campaign contributions apparently decrease marginal costs. In
other words, campaign funding seems to open politicians’ doors to the interests of cellular
ﬁrms in alleviating cost increasing regulation. The empirical signiﬁcance of α2 is also
19Estimating a model containing the full set of PUC and state variables lead to problems in empirically
identifying all of their parameters.
20The estimates in the inverse demand equation and marginal cost function qualitatively reproduce the
ﬁndings by Parker and Röller (1997).
21The cost factors ENERGY, OPERATE, and PRIME were omitted in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, because
their eﬀect appeared to be collinear to the eﬀects of the year and RENT. The inference regarding the
impact of the industry’s campaign contributions on costs is not aﬀected by this omission.
16evidence in favor of the sequential and against a simultaneous model.22
On the demand side, all variables are signiﬁcant and have the expected sign: The con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for cellular services increases over time and is higher in markets
that are large in terms of population, in markets with many business establishments, and
in rich and densely populated areas.
The results of both regressions suggest that the marginal eﬀect of campaign contribu-
tions on price caps is signiﬁcant and positive. This implies that ﬁrms’ lobbying activity
was successful and higher eﬀorts have been rewarded with a more favorable price regula-
tion23 The coeﬃcients of the PUCTERM, PUCSAL, PUCSTAFF indicate that campaign
contributions have been more eﬀective in increasing the price cap when the PUC’s mem-
bers were in oﬃce for a longer term and had higher salaries and when the PUC employed
more staﬀ. Intuitively, longer oﬃce terms help lobbyists to establish a mutual beneﬁciary
relationship with regulators, while high monetary compensations for PUC oﬃcials might
reduce their bias towards organized interest groups. In addition, the larger a regulatory
body is, the more diﬃcult it is for the lobbyists to locate appropriate contact persons and
to woo all bureaucrats who are involved in cellular price regulation. State characteristics
signiﬁcantly inﬂuencing the price cap eﬀect are population and per capita income.
The average conduct in duopoly markets is in both speciﬁcations around 0.5 and sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 (cartel behavior) as well as from 0 (perfect competition). The
hypothesis of Cournot Nash conduct, i.e. θ
Q =0 .5, is not rejected at any usual signiﬁ-
cance level. Hence, the cellular services markets in our sample seem to be in a Cournot
equilibrium, on average. This ﬁnding contradicts the result by Parker and Röller (1997),
who conclude that cellular service prices were on average higher than in a noncooperative
22For a rigorous statistical test we would have to evaluate the empirical signiﬁcance of dQ∗
ims/dLs
as speciﬁed in (12) taking into account the variation of all variables and parameter estimates in the
denominator.
23In both, table 4 and 5, b δ0 is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level. The loose relationship between
campaign ccontributions and price caps may result from the fact that campaign contributions are not a
perfect measure of ﬁrms’ attempt to inﬂuence price regulation. Indeed, the connection between campaign
contributions and price caps is more indirect than the link between contributions and cost reducing policy
decisions: While politicians have a very direct impact on the laws passed, they can only try to exert
inﬂuence on members of the Public Utility Commissions, who eventually decide on the level of price caps.
17duopoly.24
The estimate of the average lobbying coordination in states with more than one cellular
ﬁrm is around 0.5. Note that the lobbying conjectural variation corresponding to a Nash
equilibrium is 1/Is. The mean of Is in our sample is 2.55 with a standard deviation of
1.12. Thus, θ
L would on average equal 0.392 with a standard deviation of 0.169 in a Nash
equilibrium. Ignoring the variation of Is, the estimated lobbying conduct in tables 4 and
5i sn o ts i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from Nash behavior (at signiﬁcance levels of 1% or 5%).
With b φ being positive and signiﬁcant, both speciﬁcations suggest that price caps in
regulated markets imposed binding constraints on the ﬁrms’ quantity decisions.
5.2 Firm-Speciﬁc Cost Advantages From Lobbying
The estimates discussed above build on the assumption that all ﬁr m sw i t h i nas t a t eh a v e
the same marginal cost reduction and the same price cap increase. This implies that,
at least for identical ﬁrms, the regulation that the cellular operators try to aﬀect via
campaign contributions is a public good among them. We now allow for asymmetry
across ﬁrms with regard to their individual beneﬁt from lobbying in terms of reducing
production costs. Hence, we estimate a system of equations as before, with the diﬀerence
that α2 is now ﬁrm speciﬁc.25
The ﬁgures displayed in table 6 are the results obtained from a speciﬁcation which
controls for PUC characteristics as in table 4. Estimates analogous to those in table 5 are
very similar and omitted. Table 6 shows that, although campaign contributions lead to a
reduction in marginal costs for all ﬁrms, some companies were able to achieve substantially
larger cost cuts than others.26,27 For the lower part of table 6 we reestimated the system
24We also ﬁnd Nash behavior in the Cournot game by estimating inverse demand and the quantity
relation with exogenous lobbying (θ
Q =0 .64, t-value 1.244 for the diﬀerence to Nash behavior and 3.2 for
the null hypothesis of cartel). The remaining market parameters are very similar to those displayed in
tables 4 and 5 with the notable exception of φ, which is not signiﬁcant. Hence, ignoring the endogeneity
of lobbying seems to underestimate the relevance of the price caps in regulated markets. Consequently,
we would underestimate the eﬀectiveness of the price regulation applied to the cellular industry, if its
endogeneity induced by the ﬁrm’s incentive to lobby, is ignored.
25The necessary adjustments to the estimation equations are discussed in appendix B.
26Table 6 excludes most estimates, since they were very similar to those displayed in tables 4 and 5.
27As noted in appendix B, ﬁrm varying α2i imply that ﬁrms’ quantities within each market will generally
18with only three categories of ﬁrms. It becomes evident that campaign contributions
were most eﬀective in reducing costs for the Bell companies, the regional remains of
AT&T after its divesture. With the argument that the market for local calls is a case
for natural monopoly, these Bell companies were assigned monopoly rights in a regulated
environment. In this light, the results of table 6 suggests that Bell companies were able
to proﬁt from their long-term relationship with regulators and politicians by obtaining a
competitive advantage to the expense of other carriers.28
5.3 Robustness Checks
We do not have information on all markets within a state. Therefore, the estimation of the
lobbying equation (13) might be prone to measurement bias, because it aggregates market
information. Due to the nonlinearity of (13) it is impossible to predict the direction of the
potential bias. For this reason we evaluated the robustness of all results discussed in this
section by only using the data of those states and times for which our market data covers
at least 50% or 80% of the population with access to cellular services.29 For 116 states
our observations cover at least 50% of the population with access to cellular services (279
markets). Requiring at least 80% coverage of the on-line poulation, reduces the number
of state and market level observations to 116 and 178, respectively. While some estimates
lose signiﬁcance, none of our results regarding hypotheses about conduct, the price cap
constraint, the eﬀect of lobbying on costs, and its asymmetry across ﬁrms are aﬀected by
this. However, some of models with ﬁrm eﬀects did not converge anymore.
diﬀer. With only market-level data available, the speciﬁcation of the lobbying equation in (13) is based
on averaging, since it relies on the assumption that Qims = Qms/Ims. In order to test the reliability of
the α2i estimates in table 6, we also estimate the market equations separately, because the market-level
quantity relation is additively separable in Qims and thus not sensititve to asymmetry. With the caveat
of ignoring the endogeneity of lobbying, the results conﬁrm the ﬁndings shown in table 6.
28The diﬀerence between Bell companies and their independent rivals might also be due to the former
having more experience with regulation in the telecommunication sector, which lead them to learn that
they were more eﬀective in lobbying for cost-reducing measures than in attempting to persuade regulators
to set higher price caps. This argument put forward by Teske (1991) is, however, beyond the scope of
our model.
29The results of the robustness checks are not displayed in the appendix but they can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
196C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper applies established methods from the ﬁeld of empirical industrial organiza-
tion to political economy questions. We provide a uniﬁed structural framework for the
simultaneous study of ﬁrms’ product market strategies and their interaction in lobbying
for regulation. This enables us to perform statistical inference about the primitives of
the lobbying decision and to test the type of the game that ﬁrms play. Based on conjec-
tural variations we derive an empirical measure for the political coordination of ﬁrms and
identify it through the interactions between the market game and lobbying.
We also acknowledge that ﬁrms have an incentive to persuade politicians to alleviate
cost increasing regulation. To the extent that ﬁrms successfully lobby for political deci-
sions that reduce their costs, production costs are endogenous. Ignoring the endogeneity
biases the inference about ﬁrms’ product market conduct.
Applying our model to the early U.S. cellular telecommunications industry, we ﬁnd
that, on average, product markets and lobbying, as measured by political campaign con-
tributions, were in a Cournot Nash equilibrium. In regulated states price caps inﬂicted
restrictions on ﬁrms’ market conduct. The observed campaign contributions were appar-
ently eﬀective in both, lowering the burden of the price cap and reducing the production
costs.
T h ec o s te ﬀect of campaign contributions is very signiﬁcant and suggests that costs
are indeed endogenous. Moreover, the cost advantage achieved through lobbying varies
substantially across the cellular operators. In particular, Bell companies are found to
have proﬁt e di nt e r m so fg r e a t e rc o s tr e d u c i n ge ﬀects. To investigate the reason for this
apparent advantage of Bell companies it would be indispensable to extend the analysis to
ﬁrm-level data.
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23A The Log-Likelihood Function
The FIML estimation applied in this study matches the speciﬁc data structure: policy
and lobbying decisions are taken at the state level but each state contains an idiosyncratic
number of markets, Ms. Denote the vector of residuals for state s with εs,w i t hdim(εs)=
2Ms +1 . The residuals are a vector valued function fs of all endogenous variables ys =
(P1s,...P Mss,Q 1s,...Q Mss,L s)0 and all exogenous variables xs:
εs = fs(ys,xs).
The log-likelihood of estimating equation (13), Ms inverse demand equations (8), and Ms
quantity setting equations (11) by nonlinear FIML is




















where Σs is the state speciﬁcc o v a r i a n c ea n dJs = ∂fs/∂y0










where ΣP and ΣQ are covariance matrices of the inverse demand and supply equations
respectively, while σL denotes the variance of the lobbying equation. The matrices ΣPL
and ΣQL are the covariances between the market equations and the lobbying equation.
We assume that all markets and all states are independent and that all residuals of a
speciﬁct y p eo fe q u a t i o na r ed r a w nf r o mt h es a m enormal distribution with mean zero and
variance σP, σQ,a n dσL.T h e r e b yΣP = 1Ms ·σP, ΣQ = 1Ms ·σQ,a n dΣPQ = 1Ms ·σPQ,
where 1Ms is a Ms-dimensional identity matrix and σPQ denotes the covariance between
the inverse demand equation and the supply equation in the same market. Furthermore,
let the covariance between the market equations and the state equation be such that (I)
the general ”aﬃnity” of the state equation to a speciﬁc type of market activity (i.e., de-
mand or supply) within this state is independent of the number of these markets and (II)
the covariances between the state equation and all market equations of the same type in
this state are equal. Assumption (I) is reﬂected by cov(εLs,εPs1 + ···+ εPsM s)=σPL
24and cov(εLs,εQs1 + ···+ εQsMs)=σQL while assumption (II) leads to cov(εLs,εPs1)=
··· = cov(εLs,εPsMs) and cov(εLs,εQs1)=··· = cov(εLs,εQsMs). T h i si m p l i e st h a t
cov(εLs,εPsm)=1 /MsσPL and cov(εLs,εQsm)=1 /MsσQL for all markets m =1 ,...,M s.
Hence, ΣPL = uMs · σPL/Ms and ΣQL = uMs · σQL/Ms,w h e r euMs is a Ms-dimensional
column vector of ones. With this structure, the correlation between the lobbying equation
and the sum of the residuals of the market equations of either type decreases in Ms.30
30In a sensitivity check, we imposed σPL = σQL =0 . The estimates are qualitatively not aﬀected by
this change.
25B Estimation Equations with Firm-SpeciﬁcL o b b y -
ing Eﬀects
Allowing for ﬁrm speciﬁc cost reductions through lobbying requires the estimation of a
ﬁrm speciﬁc parameter α2i in the marginal cost function (9). This changes the empirical



















where Fims is an indicator equal to one if ﬁrm i operates in market m in state s and F
denotes the total number of ﬁrms in our sample.31
Adjusting the lobbying equation (13) to accommodate ﬁrm speciﬁc α2i-parameters,
requires ﬁrm-level quantity data, which are not available in our context. Therefore we












































s ) − 1. (16)
31Note that, although marginal costs are now a ﬁrm-speciﬁc function, the aggregation of the quantity
relation to the market level does not require symmetry regarding production. This is due to the linearity
of Ci(·) in Qims.
26CT a b l e s
Table 1. Deﬁnition of Variables
Variables Deﬁnition
P Monthly bill for 500 minutes usage
(assuming consumers chose the least expensive plan)1)
Q Quantity proxy: Total number of cells in a given network1)
TIME Time trend in months1)
POP Market (MSA) Population in million inhabitants1)
INCOME Market (MSA) annual income per capita in 10.000 $1)
DENSITY Market (MSA) population density in 100 people per square mile1)
BUSINESS Number of high-potential business establishments (business,
health care, professional and legal services, contract construction,
transportation, ﬁnance,insurance,real estate) divided by 1000 1)
ENERGY Average monthly cost per square foot of oﬃce space (in $)1)
PRIME One period lagged prime lending rate1)
WAGE Average weekly salary per employee for the cellular industry (in 100 $)1)
RENT Average monthly rent per square foot of oﬃce space1)
OPERATE Average monthly general overhead and operating expenses
per square foot of oﬃce space1)
ENTRY Dummy=1 after the second carrier enters into the market1)
SFIRMS Number of ﬁrms operating in state s at time t1)
PRICECAP Dummy=1 if price cap regulation, proﬁt regulation, or tariﬀ ﬁling requirements
applied to the mobile telecommunications industry in a state 2)
GOVDEM Dummy=1 if the state’s Governor was from the democratic party3)
GSALARY Governor’s annual salary in 10.000 $ 3)
PRESELECT Dummy = 1 if year of presidential election3)
LEGISLELECT Percentage of the state’s legislature that was up for election in a given year3)
FEDELECT Dummy = 1 if year of federal election (Senate and House)3)
TIGHT Absolute value of the % diﬀerence between Republicans’ and Democrats’
seats in the state’s legislature3)
PUCMEM Number of members in the State Public Utility Commission (PUC)3)
PUCTERM Length of term of the PUC members (years)3)
PUCSTAFF Number of full-time employees in the State Public Utility Commission3)
PUCSAL PUC members’ annual salary in 10.000 $ 3)
POPSTATE State population in million inhabitants 3)
INCSTATE State annual income per capita in 10.000 $ 3)
LOBBY Total industry annual campaign contributions in 10.000 $ (without AT&T)4)
Sources: 1) Parker-Röller, 1997; 2) Shew, 1994; 3) The Book of States, The U.S. Statistical
Abstract; 4) Center of Responsive Politics
27Table 2. Preliminary Statistics - Market Variables
Full sample Aggregated sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
p 1.972 0.393 1.952 0.400
Q 15.665 17.346 15.097 16.976
TIME 49.240 12.342 51.309 13.879
POP 0.186 0.266 0.172 0.251
INCOME 2.825 0.375 2.809 0.371
DENSITY 0.502 0.398 0.479 0.372
BUSINESS 2.247 0.413 2.226 0.426
ENERGY 1.760 0.372 1.764 0.376
PRIME 9.456 1.107 9.363 1.150
WAGE 5.197 1.285 5.239 1.342
RENT 16.247 4.904 16.526 4.884
OPERATE 6.704 1.683 6.622 1.688
ENTRY 0.680 0.467 0.699 0.449
Observations 478 288
Table 3. Preliminary Statistics - Political Variables


















28Table 4. Estimation Results
With Controls for PUC Characteristics
Estimate Std.Dev T-value
b α0_CONST 1.3463 0.0865 15.56
b α1_QUANTITY 0.0234 0.0015 15.48
b α2_LOBBYING -0.0762 0.0063 -12.03
b α3_WAGE 0.0379 0.0124 3.05
b α3_RENT 0.0104 0.0033 3.18
b α3_YEAR 0.1134 0.019 5.97
b β0_CONST 1.4715 0.1472 10.00
b β1_QUANTITY -0.2460 0.0329 -7.47
b β2_POP 0.7672 0.1077 7.12
b β2_BUSINESS 0.0818 0.0386 2.12
b β2_INCOME 0.1810 0.0504 3.59
b β2_DENSITY 0.2747 0.0630 4.36
b β2_YEAR 0.0404 0.0167 2.43
b δ0_CONST 0.3646 0.2149 1.70
b δ1_PUCMEM -0.0395 0.0255 -1.55
b δ1_PUCTERM 0.0563 0.0306 1.84
b δ1_PUCSTAFF -0.0501 0.0183 -2.74







b φ 2.3635 0.7123 3.32
Log-Likelihood -930.56
29Table 5. Estimation Results
With Controls for State Characteristics
Estimate Std.Dev T-value
b α0_CONST 1.3590 0.0860 15.79
b α1_QUANTITY 0.0235 0.0015 15.31
b α2_LOBBYING -0.0767 0.0064 -11.99
b α3_WAGE 0.0383 0.0124 3.08
b α3_RENT 0.0092 0.0033 2.79
b α3_YEAR 0.1149 0.0192 5.97
b β0_CONST 1.4755 0.1474 10.01
b β1_QUANTITY -0.2461 0.0331 -7.43
b β2_POP 0.7649 0.108 7.08
b β2_BUSINESS 0.0813 0.0388 2.10
b β2_INCOMES 0.1803 0.0504 3.58
b β2_DENSITYS 0.2724 0.0631 4.32
b β2_YEAR 0.0405 0.0167 2.43
b δ0_CONST 0.4220 0.2359 1.79
b δ1_GOVDEM 0.0120 0.0737 0.16
b δ1_GSALARY 0.0270 0.0303 0.89
b δ1_POP_STATE -0.1862 0.0711 -2.62
b δ1_INC_STATE -0.3356 0.1641 -2.04
b δ1_TIGHT 0.0686 0.1660 0.41







b φ 2.3107 0.7115 3.25
Log-Likelihood -926.6
30Table 6. Firm-Speciﬁc Cost Advantages Through Lobbying
Firm Estimate Std.Dev. T-value
(12 categories of ﬁrms)
Contel Cellular** -0.0073 0.0200 -0.34
GTE Mobilnet** -0.0261 0.0079 -3.32
McCaw Communications** -0.0463 0.0066 -6.99
US West Cellular* -0.1487 0.0126 -11.83
Century Cellular** -0.1427 0.0144 -9.92
PacTel Mobile Access* -0.0366 0.0095 -3.84
SouthWest Bell Mobile* -0.1266 0.0122 -10.4
Ameritech Mobile* -0.1122 0.0129 -8.73
Bell Atlantic Mobile* -0.0899 0.0154 -5.85
Nynex Mobile* -0.1234 0.0166 -7.45
BellSouth Mobility* -0.1234 0.0102 -12.11
Others (small) -0.0581 0.0056 -10.29
(3 categories of ﬁrms)
BELL* -0.0942 0.0070 -13.36
IND** -0.0509 0.0057 -8.88
Others (small) -0.0609 0.0067 -9.12
*Bell companies (BELL).
**Independent operators (IND).
31